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For Whom the CloCk Drips
Andrew M. riggsby
some years ago, danielle Allen gave an enlightening account of the politi-
cal force of the adoption of public water-clocks in fifth- and fourth-century 
Athens.1 she found a close connection between these devices and democratic 
politics. However, she also noted in passing that similar technology, used 
differently, could have a different political force (Allen 1996.164). what i 
propose in this note is a case study of the potential for variation. instead of 
a broad survey like Allen’s, i will examine texts by a single author, Pliny 
the younger (obviously part of a different culture as well). in this narrower 
compass, a finer-grained reading is possible, and in particular, we will be 
able to see both diachronic shifts in the use of the same clocks and syn-
chronic contestation of their political potential. even though the alternatives 
are all certainly non-democratic, that still leaves considerable room for the 
negotiation of authority.
Letter 1.23 purports to answer the question of a younger friend, 
Falco, as to whether it was appropriate to argue cases while holding the 
tribunate. Pliny says that he himself had avoided the practice for several 
reasons, among them, it appeared deforme, “unseemly,” that “someone who 
could command silence from anyone, would himself be silenced by a water-
clock” (“qui iubere posset tacere quemcumque, huic silentium clepsydra 
indici,” 1.23.2). The use of the water-clock to limit advocates’ time pro-
duced a conflict of authority; the personal authority embodied in the tribune 
opposes and is subordinated to the more mechanical authority of the clock 
1 This short paper has been a long time in the making and has gone through a dispropor-
tionate number of helpful hands. i would like to extend particular thanks to Matt roller 
and barbara gold for extremely helpful comments.
272 Andrew M. Riggsby
 2 On the use of the tribunate in this letter, see further Hoffer 1999.197, 201. in the legal 
(as opposed to the specifically political) sphere, the tribunes still had some role to play 
(Sherwin-White 1966.139–40), though the conflicts with the praetor’s justice described in 
this letter are at least in part based on symbolic rather than technical concerns.
 3 On the Lucan passage in its own right, see Feeney 1986. On the allusion, see guillemin 
1929.119, Hoffer 1999.197, and schuster’s 1952 Teubner. Pliny reproduces all three of 
Lucan’s words and most of his syntax (the equation of the two nouns and the choice of 
which is modified by the adjective) and his general context (politics, the loss of author-
ity). He uses umbra ten other times, all but one literally (for the exception, see below). A 
more adventurous reading might take these two cases as part of a broader set of similar 
phrases in generally similar contexts, but for present purposes it is not crucial to admit 
the larger network. For those instances, however, see Pliny 8.24.4: “reliquam umbram et 
residuum libertatis nomen” (concerning greek states now under roman rule), Lucan 1.135 
(the narrator speaking of Pompey “the great”), sen. EM 80.5: vanum . . . nomen libertatis 
(on the fictional nature of legal freedom and slavery), Quintilian 12.10.15: umbra magni 
nominis. Pliny’s teacher Quintilian used his phrase to describe the Atticists’ rigorously 
narrowed rhetoric in contrast to the “real” thing as practiced by, e.g., Cicero. For Quintil-
ian, contention between rule-governed (devinctum . . . illis legibus) and pragmatic rheto-
ric need not involve contrasts in time periods or forms of government (and, in fact, he is 
unclear on whether the roman Atticists about whom he has so much to say actually still 
exist in his time). Nonetheless, he does connect the phrase specifically to oratory (rather 
than just politics in general), and the opposition between engaged and formalist rhetorics 
is one that would naturally lead Pliny back to a chronological interpretation (cf. riggsby 
1995.128–29).
and the formalisms of legal proceedings in general. At the beginning of 
the letter, Pliny had suggested the original question drew particular force 
from changes in historical circumstance: “it makes a big difference what 
you think the tribunate is: an empty shadow and name without honor or a 
sacrosanct official power” (“plurimum refert quid esse tribunatum putes: 
inanem umbram et sine honore nomen an potestatem sacrosanctam,” 1.23.1). 
“shadow” suggests an alternative form of the tribunate that could be found 
only in the past. He does not specify how far back the comparison is meant 
to go, but the republic seems most likely. The tribunate was traditionally the 
most activist office, and its loss of potestas would in that sense have been 
the most striking.2 Lucanian intertexts make a similar point. As has long 
been recognized, Pliny’s phrasing parallels Lucan 1.135: nominis umbra 
(the narrator’s description of Pompey) and 2.303: “nomen . . . et inanem 
. . . umbram” (Cato’s description of Libertas).3 Thus Pliny’s reply to Falco 
takes a potentially general question and sets it squarely against the fall of 
the republic. He does not suggest reversion to the old order, but he also 
says nothing to show that the tribunate had not become an “empty shadow.” 
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 4 Avoidance of such real-world conflicts enables the textual strategy Hoffer 1999.195 describes 
as “one of [Pliny‘s] characteristic tropes, the productive self-delusion.”
 5 According to the one clock in Pliny’s corpus for which we can make the calculation, one 
clock-turn came to slightly less than twenty minutes. in translating clepsydra (in the sense 
of a unit of time), i have allowed myself a certain freedom and inconsistency for the sake 
of english idiom.
 6 The laws referred to here and (in a somewhat similar context) at 1.20.11 are presumably 
the statutory time limits on speakers in criminal cases, for which see 4.9.9. by contrast 
to these limits, the time alloted to speakers in civil cases was, Pliny suggests, quite short. 
diachronically, however, Pliny realizes that time has shrunk in both civil and criminal 
trials.
Rather, he advises Falco to avoid situations in which the fiction of original 
authority could not be maintained.4
Letter 6.2 treats the question of timed speech at much greater length, 
and makes explicit some ideas that are only suggested in 1.23. Here he regrets 
a move to shorten already short time limits on speakers in courts: “The cus-
tom of giving, and even requesting, time in forty- or twenty-, sometimes 
even ten-, minute increments5 has spread and grown stronger” (“increbuit 
passim et invaluit consuetudo binas vel singulas clepsydras, interdum etiam 
dimidias et dandi et petendi,” 6.2.5). The tribunate is no longer in view, but 
the question of time is still a politically loaded one. in a reading of letter 
1.20, i try to show (1995) that Pliny regarded sheer quantity of speech as 
an indicator of the relevance of “engaged public figures”—a major compo-
nent of his own self-worth. while that letter’s frame of reference explicitly 
extends to the late republic, at the beginning of this discussion, the “good 
old days” are, apparently, quite recent. Pliny is only looking back to the 
lifetime of his nemesis regulus. yet as he continues thinking aloud, his 
time horizon recedes further into the past (6.2.6):
Are we wiser than our ancestors? More just than the laws 
themselves, the laws6 that give away so many hours, so 
many days, so many hearings? do we speak more clearly, 
understand more quickly, judge more scrupulously, we 
who hurry cases along in fewer hours than the days in 
which they used to be heard?
an nos sapientiores maioribus nostris, nos legibus ipsis 
iustiores, quae tot horas, tot dies, tot comperendinationes 
largiuntur? . . . nos apertius dicimus, celerius intellegimus, 
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 7 in the course of establishing a slightly different legal point, Metzger (1997.102–03, 108–
19) demonstrates the extensibility of republican civil trials. The introduction of real time 
limits in criminal cases seems to have been an innovation (however general and/or lasting 
it was originally meant to be) of Pompey in 52 (Asc. Mil. 36.10–13C, Tac. Dial. 38.2). 
Tacitus’s Aper regards free time in general as a republican institution (Dial. 19.6).
 8 For this power (exercised much more severely), cf. Tac. Dial. 19.6, 39.4.
religiosius iudicamus, qui paucioribus clepsydris praecipi-
tamus causas, quam diebus explicari solebant?
The “ancestors” can reach back indefinitely, and where we can tell, they tend 
to be earlier than the immediately preceding generation. Cases that were 
conventionally argued in more days than the current number of hours are 
known to be republican.7 Here the new system conflicts not so much with 
individual authority as with individual obligation. in this letter, unlike the 
previous one, Pliny has a little power to change the situation. “whenever i 
decide [civil] cases (which i do even more often than i argue them), i grant 
the most time anyone asks for” (“equidem quotiens iudico, quod vel sae-
pius facio quam dico, quantum quis plurimum postulat aequae, do,” 6.2.7). 
note that Pliny does not simply give more time, or even generous time, 
but however much the speakers want.8 The clock ceases to be an imper-
sonal, systemic force. Pliny does have a pragmatic argument for this: you 
cannot really know how much time a case requires until you have heard it 
(6.2.8). Most of his concern, however, is ethical. even if extra argument is 
generally superfluous, the religio and patientia of the judge require that he 
hear cases at length. Circumventing the clock allows the judge properly to 
display his individual character and so worth.
Here i would like to bring in a somewhat different line of inquiry 
that will bring us back to the political aspect of the situation. Matthew roller 
(2001.129–287) has recently discussed the various figurations early imperial 
aristocrats used to negotiate their political and social positions vis-à-vis the 
emperor; the emperor is variously treated as father, master, host (whether 
good or bad), patron, etc. The structures roller considers are generally very 
important to roman society in their literal forms (e.g., the family, freedom 
and slavery), so it is not surprising that their figurative use to understand the 
emperor is widespread, if also widely contested. we might, however, expect 
there would also be rarer, more idiosyncratic approaches. The water-clock 
provides such an example, and of a novel kind, since it is one in which the 
emperor is not directly and personally figured.
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 9 gellius appends further discussion of the legal question based on Varro’s Res Humanae 
(13.12.5–6).
As i have sketched it here, the issue at stake in these two Plinian 
letters is slightly different from that in the texts treated by roller. Most of 
the latter treat accommodation to an imperial system. Pliny is troubled by 
the fact that he must accommodate himself to an imperial system. That is, 
the problem, from Pliny’s point of view, lies not quite in the judgment of a 
particular emperor nor the potential arbitrariness of imperial power. rather, 
it lies in the elevation of standard rules, operating automatically, over indi-
vidual judgments. In support of that interpretation, let me cite one text 
where the question is raised more explicitly and then point to one related 
line of argument already present in the secondary literature. Aulus gellius 
preserves a letter of the jurist Ateius Capito that recounts a story about the 
earlier, Augustan, jurist Labeo. The latter refused a summons to answer an 
accusation before the tribunes of the plebs on the grounds that they legally 
had the power to arrest him (prensio), but not to summon him (vocatio).9 
Capito was startled that Labeo responded in this way (13.12.2):
but a certain mad and excessive license drove the man 
to the point that, although Augustus was already emperor 
and had control of the state, he [Labeo] held nothing to 
be valid unless it were in accord with the laws of the 
ancient romans.
sed agitabat . . . hominem libertas quaedam nimia atque 
uecors usque eo, ut diuo Augusto iam principe et rem-
publicam obtinente ratum tamen pensumque nihil haberet, 
nisi quod iussum sanctumque esse in romanis antiquita-
tibus legisset.
The emperor does not intervene personally, nor, so far as we can see, does 
he have any personal interest in any aspect of the incident. it is the mere 
fact of the existence of the imperial government that gives other officials 
their increased authority (at least for Capito and gellius). neither the tribune 
nor (less surprisingly) the messenger are named. Their personal identities 
are irrelevant compared to their offices, their functions within the impe-
rial government. The extraordinary authority of the emperor permeates the 
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10 see further Feeney 2007.196–97 on the assertion of authority by Caesar and Augustus.
ordinary workings of the state apparatus, simultaneously neutralizing and 
empowering the individuals who carry out its work. Pliny the advocate is 
similarly constrained, and the impersonal nature of that constraint is well 
figured by the water-clock.
nor is the timing of speeches the only area in which imperial 
authority reinforced / was reinforced by a new, relatively impersonal tem-
poral regime. Andrew wallace-Hadrill (1997.16–18) notes the way Caesar 
and Augustus took control of the calendar (primarily, though not entirely, 
in terms of intercalation) from the hands of the several pontifices and sub-
jected it to astronomical calculation instead (p. 17):10
Knowledge, then, is relocated: from the social authority 
of a local elite guarding the cultural specificity of its tra-
ditions, to the academic authority of the experts who can 
predict the movements of the sun wherever you stand on 
the earth at whatever time in history.
The imperial co-option of the calendar, as of several other areas of knowl-
edge treated in wallace-Hadrill’s paper, involves an extra step not present in 
Pliny’s case. Authority is not vested directly in the emperor, but in technical 
experts like astronomers or jurists whose expertise can then be monopolized. 
The water-clock, unlike the calendar, can be imposed more-or-less directly. 
nonetheless, the parallel provided by the more complex case supports the 
present reading of the simpler one. both are instances of the rationalization 
of time by a centralizing imperial authority.
now, Labeo (died c. a.d. 10) could reasonably be described as a 
republican holdover, but that would be a much less plausible explanation 
for Pliny’s behavior roughly a century later. we should look to a standing 
feature of the culture, not a “transitional” period, to explain what is going 
on. Let me suggest that, at least in these two letters, the republic itself is 
not to be taken literally as a political order but as a figure of the indepen-
dent value of the individual aristocrat. Again, there is no clear objection 
to a particular emperor—even to the existence (broadly speaking) of an 
emperor. Problems in maintaining one’s dignitas in the face of superior 
authority are, as we have already noted, typically imaged in terms of rela-
tionships with the person of the emperor. but in these letters, Pliny takes 
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11 He explicitly marks the subject matter of his letter as sensitive: “But it is better to speak 
of these in person, as they concern common civic failings,” “sed de his melius coram, ut 
de pluribus vitiis civitatis,” (6.2.9). One other letter (2.11.14) mentions the water-clock 
and its function of limiting speaking time: “I spoke nearly five hours, for four clock-turns 
were added to the original ten, which i had already found very ample,” “dixi horis paene 
quinque; nam duodecim clepsydris, quas spatiosissimas acceperam, sunt additae quattuor.” 
Here (before the senate) Pliny finds his allotment generous even before it is supplemented. 
This performance, however, is before the emperor personally, and so must be described as 
well regulated.
12 On the reciprocity involved, see roller 2001.176–78, 182–93.
a slightly broader view. There can be threats to that dignity anywhere in 
the imperial world. The tone of the letters is not so much oppositional or 
subversive as nostalgic. Clearly the desire expressed in letter 6.2 to revisit 
regulus’s heyday is not to be taken literally. still, the inanimate clock may 
have been not only an appropriate metaphor for the problem, but also a 
comfortable outlet for what could otherwise have been read as a critique, 
however mild, of the current order.11
Moreover, one can see in one of Pliny’s letters a trace of resis-
tance (to use a slightly grandiose term) to the imperial order. The accom-
modation described in letter 1.23 was essentially passive: a tribune should 
avoid situations that would display his lack of authority. Letter 6.2, as was 
suggested above, has a more active approach. One of the ways in which 
systemization benefits an emperor is his (nearly) unique ability to grant 
exceptions to the rules as a favor that obligates the recipient to him.12 The 
rules become a source of personal patronage. so, for instance, seneca can 
stress to nero the ad hoc (or ad hominem) character of clementia: “Clem-
ency has free judgment; it decides not by rule, but by what is right and 
good” (“clementia liberum arbitrium habet. non sub formula, sed ex aequo 
et bono iudicat,” 2.7.3). in the case of the time limits, however, the system 
is not so rigid as to prevent manipulation by other persons. while serving 
as iudex, Pliny, too, can show his religio and, presumably, generosity by 
granting what time is requested, i.e., he can exercise a limited personal 
authority of his own. wallace-Hadrill’s programmatic essay rightly stresses 
the general trend towards centralization, but the limits of that process can 
be of interest as well. Moreover, in this case, the “limitation” is not merely 
a gap in the emperor’s exercise of power whereby speakers’ time in civil 
cases is not set by statute. The emperor’s grant of discretion to iudices is 
an enabling condition of the exercise of power by others. it is the imperial 
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creation of a generalized norm of limited time that gives Pliny’s gesture its 
force; he, too, can give the gift of time.
University of Texas at Austin
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